Abstract
Digital social networks, such as LinkedIn, Facebook, Instagram, X (formerly Twitter), and TikTok, have transformed the ways individuals, firms, and governments interact, cooperate, and compete in society. This article examines the behavioral foundations and institutional conditions of self-interest, altruism, egoism, reciprocity, and risk-sharing in digital social networks through an interdisciplinary framework that integrates economics, sociology, psychology, political theory, and cultural studies (Anthropology). Building on classical and contemporary theory, the study synthesizes conceptual contributions from Hobbes (1651), Smith (1759, 1776), Becker (1968, 1974a, 1974b), Rawls (1971, 1999), Coase (1937, 1960), and Williamson (1975, 1985, 1991) to construct a behavioral-institutional model of digital social interaction.
The research shows that society cannot understand platform behavior through a single disciplinary lens. Economic rationality, moral sentiments, social norms, fairness principles, and governance structures jointly shape social interaction. Firms in social network platform businesses conceptualize digital platforms as hybrid institutions—part markets, part hierarchies, part networks—designed to reduce transaction costs and internalize social externalities. This research highlights how digital architectures amplify or inhibit self-interest, altruism, risk-sharing, and reciprocal behavior and how egoistic or opportunistic behaviors emerge under specific institutional conditions.
Becker’s (1974a) theory of social interactions models altruism and egoism as utility-based, relational decisions. At the same time, Becker (1974b) offers a deterrence-based economic approach to crime, emphasizing rational behavior under enforcement constraints. These models complement strategic reciprocity frameworks (Axelrod, 1984; Rand & Nowak, 2013), network-based insurance models (Bloch, Genicot, & Ray, 2008), limited-commitment risk-sharing (Grochulski & Zhang, 2011), and behavioral trust experiments (Molm, Takahashi, & Peterson, 2000). Leider, Möbius, Rosenblat, and Do (2009) provide experimental confirmation that directed altruism and enforced reciprocity are contingent on social proximity, observability, and network topology. Their findings bridge relational preference models with strategic enforcement logic, reinforcing claims that platform affordances condition behavioral stability.
Empirical findings from deterrence research (Levitt, 1998; Nagin, 2013), cooperation studies (Axelrod, 1984; Rand & Nowak, 2013; Molm, Takahashi, & Peterson, 2000), and platform behavior analyses (Jhaver, Ghoshal, Bruckman, & Gilbert, 2018; Matias, 2019; Kraut & Resnick, 2012) substantiate this model. Additional insights from Capraro and Rand (2018), Suler (2004), and Marwick and Lewis (2017) demonstrate how digital platforms can amplify or distort altruistic, reciprocal, or egoistic behaviors, depending on their design, visibility, and governance (See role of government in society). Further insights from Mobile Money systems in Africa (Jack & Suri, 2011, 2014; Mbiti & Weil, 2011; Donovan, 2012) show that altruism, reciprocity, egoism, and governance failures are observable across diverse digital ecosystems, extending the framework beyond Western-centric platforms.
Empirical evidence from deterrence studies and platform behavior research enables researchers to assess how enforcement, visibility, and reputation influence cooperation affect social behavior and interactions on digital platforms. The article contributes to the broader scientific understanding of platform-mediated social behavior and provides conceptual tools for designing fair and sustainable digital governance. Bridging across different disciplines and embedding normative considerations into behavioral models explaining digital social interaction, this research lays the groundwork for future research at the intersection of human motivation, institutional design, and digital technology.
1 Introduction
Digital social networks have become central arenas of human interaction, shaping how individuals communicate, form communities, and engage in cooperative or competitive behavior. As platforms mediate an increasing share of social life, understanding the motivations behind digital behavior—ranging from self-interest to altruism, from egoism to reciprocity, and risk-sharing —has become both a scientific and societal imperative. This article addresses this complexity through an interdisciplinary inquiry that integrates behavioral economics, sociology, psychology, political theory, and anthropology (cultural studies) to model social behavior and institutional coordination on digital platforms. This research aims to provide a behavioral analytical framework for assessing both behavior and governance in the digital public sphere (e.g., social media and trading platforms) by examining how users interact with one another and with the rules, incentives, and values embedded in platform structures.
1.1 Relevance of Behavioral Models
Classical and modern theories of human behavior offer competing explanations for why individuals cooperate or defect, reciprocate or exploit, contribute or withdraw their resources and efforts. Hobbes (1651) posits egoism as the natural human condition requiring hierarchical enforcement. Smith (1759/1776) introduces the concept of moral sentiments and sympathy, anchoring reciprocity in social emotions. Becker (1974a) models altruism and egoism within a utility-maximizing framework, while Rawls (1971/1999) conceptualizes fairness and justice as rational outcomes of reciprocal reasoning. Coase (1937, 1960) and Williamson (1975, 1985, 1991) embed these behaviors in institutional settings, where governance structures emerge to economize on transaction and social costs.
Becker (1974b) advances a parallel but distinct contribution by formalizing crime as a rational economic choice. In his deterrence model, individuals choose to violate rules when the expected benefits outweigh the expected punishment, thereby enabling optimal enforcement strategies. In digital contexts—where formal punishment mechanisms are often weak or absent—this logic explains a range of egoistic platform behaviors, from fraud to the dissemination of misinformation. Becker’s dual contributions thus link relational cooperation with rational rule-breaking, framing both trust and transgression as outcomes that are utility-calculable.
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